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Abstract
For language-capable interactive robots to be effectively in-
troduced into human society, they must be able to naturally
and efficiently communicate about the objects, locations, and
people found in human environments. An important aspect of
natural language communication is the use of pronouns. Ac-
cording to the linguistic theory of the Givenness Hierarchy
(GH), humans use pronouns due to implicit assumptions about
the cognitive statuses their referents have in the minds of their
conversational partners. In previous work, Williams et al. pre-
sented the first computational implementation of the full GH
for the purpose of robot language understanding, leveraging a
set of rules informed by the GH literature. However, that ap-
proach was designed specifically for language understanding,
oriented around GH-inspired memory structures used to assess
what entities are candidate referents given a particular cogni-
tive status. In contrast, language generation requires a model
in which cognitive status can be assessed for a given entity.
We present and compare two such models of cognitive sta-
tus: a rule-based Finite State Machine model directly informed
by the GH literature and a Cognitive Status Filter designed
to more flexibly handle uncertainty. The models are demon-
strated and evaluated using a silver-standard English subset of
the OFAI Multimodal Task Description Corpus.
Keywords: Cognitive Status modeling, Natural language gen-
eration, Human-robot interaction
Introduction
As human-robot interaction becomes increasingly common,
robots need to be able to talk about the objects, locations,
and people in their environments in the same way humans
do, to facilitate concise, easy, and unambiguous communica-
tion. To reap these benefits, just like humans, robots must
be able to understand and use pronouns like it, this, and that.
The linguistic theory of the Givenness Hierarchy (GH) (Gun-
del, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993) suggests that humans tend
to use pronouns rather than longer referring expressions due
to implicit assumptions about the cognitive status the referent
has in the mind of their interlocutor. That is, the use of differ-
ent referring forms is viewed as justified based on whether the
referent is In Focus, Activated, Familiar, and so forth, within
the current conversation. Thus, for robots to understand and
generate human-like natural language they must be able to
model this notion of cognitive status.
Previously, Williams and Scheutz (2019) (see also
(Williams, Acharya, Schreitter, & Scheutz, 2016; Williams,
Krause, Oosterveld, & Scheutz, 2018)) presented the first full
computational implementation of the GH for the purpose of
robotic natural language understanding, using a set of hand-
crafted rules informed by the GH literature. However, that
approach was designed specifically for robotic natural lan-
guage understanding, oriented around GH-inspired memory
structures used to assess what entities are candidate referents
given a particular cognitive status. In contrast, natural lan-
guage generation requires a model in which cognitive status
can be assessed for a given entity.
Such a model of cognitive status could either be developed
as a rule-based model (not dissimilar from the rule-based
approach to GH-theoretic language understanding taken by
Williams and Scheutz (2019)), or could instead be developed
as a statistical model which would attempt to learn to pre-
dict an entity’s cognitive status from data. While in practice
both rule-based and data-driven empirical models are useful
(Bangalore & Rambow, 2005), data-driven models may be
better able to handle unseen, uncertain situations (Bangalore
& Johnston, 2003; Bangalore & Rambow, 2005).
In this paper, we thus propose (and compare to a rule-based
Finite State Machine (FSM) model) the Cognitive Status Fil-
ter (CSF): a data-driven probabilistic model of cognitive sta-
tus, structured to be optimized for natural language genera-
tion rather than natural language understanding, trained and
evaluated using a silver-standard1 English subset of the OFAI
Multimodal Task Description Corpus (Schreitter & Krenn,
2016). Specifically, the CSF seeks to predict the cognitive
status for a given entity based on whether and how it has been
referenced in natural language.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Af-
ter discussing related work on cognitive status and refer-
ring expressions, we formally define the concept of a Cog-
nitive Status Filter. We then present the results of a crowd-
sourced human-subject experiment to gather the data neces-
sary to train and evaluate this model, and compare the CSF
model’s performance to that of a rule-based Finite State Ma-
chine model. Finally, we discuss our results and conclude
with possible directions for future work.
Related Work
The Givenness Hierarchy, originally presented by Gundel et
al. (1993), consists of a nested hierarchy of six tiers of cog-
1This subset constitutes English transliteration of originally Ger-
man dialogues.
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nitive status: {in focus ⊆ activated ⊆ familiar ⊆ uniquely
identifiable ⊆ referential ⊆ type identifiable}, each of which
is associated with a set of referring (or pronominal) forms
that can be used when referring to an entity with that status
(Gundel et al., 2006; Hedberg, 2013). The hierarchical nest-
ing here means that an entity with one status can also be said
to have all other statuses lower in the hierarchy. If a target
referent is in focus, for example, it can also be inferred to be
activated, familiar, and so forth. Accordingly, a speaker’s se-
lection of a pronominal form depends on their assumptions as
to the cognitive status of their target referent in the mind of
their conversational partner. For example, if a speaker uses
“it” to refer to an object, the listener can infer that the object
being referenced must be one that is already in focus, whereas
if a speaker uses “that < NP >”, the speaker can only infer
that the object is at least familiar (but may in fact be activated
or even in focus).
The hierarchical structure of the GH is also important due
to the way it parallels the hierarchical nesting of models of
human memory, such as Cowan (1998)’s, in which the fo-
cus of attention is a subset of short-term memory (or working
memory), which is in turn a subset of long-term memory.
The GH coding protocol, presented by Gundel et al.
(2006), provides guidelines as to what features of linguistic
and environmental context should dictate the cognitive status
of a given entity. For example, this protocol suggests that an
entity that is mentioned in a topic role in the preceding clause
should be considered to be in focus, and that any entity that
is mentioned at all should be considered to be at least acti-
vated (Gundel et al., 2006; Hedberg, 2013).
Due to the GH’s popularity within the research literature,
and its validation across a wide variety of languages beyond
English (Gundel, Bassene, Gordon, Humnick, & Khalfaoui,
2010), many researchers have sought to computationally im-
plement it in whole or in part, especially within the context
of reference resolution algorithms. Kehler (2000), for exam-
ple, use the GH to justify an approach in which elements of
an interface that are highlighted are considered to be ”in fo-
cus”, and referring expressions that use pronominal forms are
automatically resolved to those highlighted referents.
Building on this work, Chai, Hong, and Zhou (2004) pro-
posed a probabilistic graph-matching algorithm for resolv-
ing referring expressions that are complex (involving multi-
ple target referents) and ambiguous (involving gestures that
could indicate multiple candidate referents) in multimodal
user interfaces. Because this algorithm had high computa-
tional complexity, Chai, Prasov, and Qu (2006) demonstrated
how the algorithm’s performance could be improved using
a greedy algorithm based on the theories of Conversational
Implicature (Dale & Reiter, 1995; Grice, 1975) and the GH.
Chai et al. combine these theories to create a reduced hi-
erarchy: Gesture ⊆ Focus ⊆ Visible ⊆ Others, where Focus
combines the “in focus” and “activated” tiers of the GH, and
Visible combines its “familiar” and “uniquely identifiable”
tiers. When a referring expression is processed, the relation-
ship between referring form and status is then used to help
resolve that referring expression.
Finally, while the approaches above focused on model-
ing of reduced versions of the GH, Williams et al. (2016);
Williams and Scheutz (2019) instead presented an implemen-
tation of the full GH, through a set of rules that associated
different referring forms with different sequences of actions
involving all six tiers of the GH. This required, in part, four
data structures corresponding to the top four tiers of cognitive
statuses of the GH, while the last two tiers were instead as-
sociated with new “mnemonic actions” such as creating new
mental representations (Williams & Scheutz, 2019).
In all of these previous approaches, the GH is used to jus-
tify a set of data structures used to store representations for
entities that could be referred to, and to justify which of these
data structures should be considered (and how) when a given
referring form is used. However, while this is sensible during
natural language understanding, it may not be appropriate for
the purposes of natural language generation. During genera-
tion, the speaker already knows what object they wish to refer
to, and do not need to search through these sorts of data struc-
tures. Instead, when a speaker decides what referring form to
use to refer to a given object, we argue that they would instead
start by determining the status of that object, and only then
may they look through the data structure associated with that
status, in order to determine what distractors must be ruled
out. Critically, this requires the ability to quickly determine
the cognitive status of a given entity. Accordingly, in the next
section we propose an approach to this problem, which we
term as cognitive status modeling.
Problem Formulation
We formulate cognitive status modeling as a Bayesian filter-
ing problem. Let a dialogue D consist of a set of utterances
U0, ...,Un. For object o, let Sto ∈ {I,A,F} denote the cognitive
status of o at a particular timestep t after utterance Ut (either
In Focus, Activated or Familiar), and let Lto ∈ {N,M,T} de-
note the linguistic status of o in utterance Ut (e.g., either not
mentioned in the utterance, mentioned in the utterance in a
non-topic role, or mentioned in the utterance in a topic role).
Using this formalism, our goal is to recursively estimate, for
a given object, the probability distribution over cognitive sta-
tuses for object o at time t:
p(Sto) = p(S
t−1
o )p(L
t
o)p(S
t
o | St−1o ,Lto) (1)
We define a Bayesian filter of this form as a
Cognitive Status Filter (CSF) for a given object o. Given
a set of known objects, O = {o1, ...,on}, our goal is then
to estimate this distribution for each o ∈ O at each time
step. To do so, we use a Cognitive Status Modeling Engine
C, consisting of a set of CSFs {c0, ...,c1}, one for each
object believed to be of a status familiar or higher within the
conversation. Here, we make the simplifying assumption
that the same set of objects are known to both the robot and
its conversational partner, meaning that the set of all objects
with status Uniquely Identifiable or higher is simply the set of
objects O. We assume that it is straightforward to determine
whether one of these objects is or is not Familiar based on
whether or not it has appeared in the current conversation.
This allows us to model whether or not an object is of status
Familiar or higher based on whether or not a CSF c ∈ C
exists for that object, and to model which of those statuses
the object likely has, using its associated CSF.
Data Collection
The core component of our CSF model that must be learned
ahead of time is the conditional probability p(Sto | St−1o ,Lto).
To learn this, we trained our model using a silver-standard
English translation of the German OFAI Multimodal Task
Description corpus (Schreitter & Krenn, 2016). The corpus
represents a collection of human-human and human-robot in-
teractions where the human teacher shows and explains to a
human or robot learner how to connect two separate parts of a
tube and then how to mount the tube onto a box with holders,
as shown in Figure 1 by actually moving around the objects
and performing the task while explaining it to the learner. The
average length of a sentence that is used in this corpus has
8-9 words. As the name suggests, since the corpus is “multi-
modal”, the corpus contains both verbal and non-verbal cues
such as speech, gaze, and gestures. Realistic multimodal HRI
scenarios require the use of such non-verbal cues; however
as our first step we begin in this work by looking only at our
model’s ability to handle the same kind of linguistic factors
that are handled by the GH, leaving the ability to model other
linguistic factors for future work.
While the OFAI MTD corpus contains data from four task
scenarios, we only use the data from one particular task sce-
nario (Task 3). The original dataset for this task consists of
16 monologues each having approximately 4 to 5 utterances.
As a first step, in this work we begin by evaluating our model
on a small subset of the original dataset, consisting of 4 of
these monologues, each of which is comprised of just 4 utter-
ances, to control for monologue length. As shown in Figure
1, this task context contains 8 objects, including the learner
and teacher.
Task 3 was selected because it includes a larger number of
objects than the other tasks in a dyadic instruction context,
and contains data from both human-human and human-robot
dyads. Specifically, Task 1 involved a human teacher explain-
ing and performing a task in front of the camera without the
presence of a learner in the scenario; Task 2 involved a hu-
man teacher and a human learner jointly performing the task
of moving an object; and Task 4 is a pure “navigation task”
involving both human-human and human-robot dyads (Schre-
itter & Krenn, 2016).
Appearance Feature Annotation
To collect linguistic status information L, three annotators in-
dependently annotated the OFAI Multimodal Task Descrip-
tion Corpus (Schreitter & Krenn, 2016) according to the fol-
lowing annotation procedure. Each annotator was provided
a printed copy of all 16 monologues to annotate. For each
sentence in each monologue, the annotator was instructed to
underline any piece of the text that could refer to some object
in the scene. For each of these underlined pieces of text, the
annotator was instructed to indicate the correspondence be-
tween the underlined sentence fragment and the object in the
scene it referred to. Finally, the annotator was required to cir-
cle the fragment-object mapping they believed to be the topic
of the sentence. There were a few cases in which annotators
circled multiple objects as the topic of the sentence; in these
cases, both objects were recorded as being equally probable
topic referents2.
Cognitive Status Annotation
Ground-truth cognitive status information was then collected
through a crowdsourced human-subject experiment. 160 US
participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Two participants answered an attention check question incor-
rectly and were dropped from our analysis, leaving 158 par-
ticipants (71 female, 85 male, 2 N/A). Participant ages ranged
from 19 to 70 years (M = 35.03, SD = 11.36). Each partici-
pant was paid $0.25 for completing the study.
Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, each par-
ticipant is shown the scene depicted in Figure 1, and is in-
structed to remember the objects and their labelings in order
to performing their upcoming task. Participants were then
shown the same scene without labels while listening to a por-
tion of one of the experiment’s four monologues, as read
by the experimenters. Specifically, participants were ran-
domly assigned to hear a random prefix of a randomly se-
lected monologue (i.e., either only the first utterance of that
monologue, the first two, the first three, or all four).
Figure 1: Scene (labeled)
At the end of this monologue excerpt, participants were
2The inter-annotator agreement score as measured through
Fleiss’ Kappa was κn = 0.37, indicating fair agreement between an-
notators. It will be important in future work to adapt the annotation
protocol to increase rate of agreement.
asked to answer two questions, presented in a randomized
order, with the second question becoming available after the
first question was answered. The two questions are as fol-
lows:
• Q1: Click on the object in the scene that you think the
speaker would most likely be referring to if the speaker
would have said “look at it” at the end of the monologue.
• Q2: Click on all the objects in the scene that you think
the speaker would most likely be referring to if the speaker
would have said “look at that” at the end of the monologue.
Two of the monologues used in our experiment are shown
below.
Monologue 1:
U1: You must take the tube with your right hand.
U2: And insert it in at the yellow-green connection here.
U3: Put it on the tube.
U4: Again, with your right hand insert it here in the holder.
Monologue 2:
U1: With the right hand stick the two tubes together.
U2: You put that together here with the yellow-green mark.
U3: It is okay that it is not holding firmly.
U4: Now lead the one tube through here.
These questions allowed us to probe the user’s implicit be-
liefs as to the cognitive status of the objects in the scene.
From a GH-theoretic perspective, if a participant implicitly
believed a given object to be in focus, they should click on
that particular object for both Q1 and Q2, whereas if they
believed the object to be activated, they should click on that
object for Q2 but not for Q1. Because the context is narrowly
defined and participants were given time to examine each ob-
ject in the scene, we assume that all objects in the scene are
familiar or higher. Thus, if a participant believed the object
to be familiar or lower, they should not click on the object at
all. After completing the task, participants completed a check
question (cf. Schreitter and Krenn (2016)) requiring users to
identify the scene they had viewed from among several dis-
tractors. This allowed us to ignore data from participants who
did not pay sufficient attention while completing the task.
Using this coding procedure, we are thus able to determine
the perceived cognitive status of each object in the scene for
each participant after the completion of the monologue ex-
cerpt they were exposed to. When paired with the linguistic
status annotations, this allowed us to train our CSF model,
using the procedure described in the following section.
Training and Evaluation
Training
After collecting this dataset, our CSF was trained in the fol-
lowing way: First, we initialized a 9x3 matrix whose rows
correspond to the nine cognitive/linguistic status pairs an ob-
ject could have at time t− 1 ((It−1,Nt), (It−1,Mt), (It−1,Tt),
(At−1,Nt), (At−1,Mt), (At−1,Tt), (Ft−1,Nt), (Ft−1,Mt),
(Ft−1,Tt)), and whose columns correspond to the three cog-
nitive statuses that object could have at time t (It , At , Ft ).
For each pair of adjacent utterances in each monologue
(Ut−1,Ut), we consider the data from all participants (for
all objects) who provided data immediately following utter-
ance Ut−1, and from all participants who provided data im-
mediately following utterance Ut . For each resulting pair
of datapoints, we identify and increment the correct cell in
this matrix. For example, for the combination of a data-
point from a participant who heard some utterance and subse-
quently viewed that object as in focus, and a datapoint from
a participant who heard the next utterance in the same mono-
logue, containing object 1 in a non-topic role, and at that point
viewed the object as being activated, we would increment
the cell ((It−1,Nt),At). Once all data has been considered,
we normalize each row of this table to produce a conditional
probability table.
Evaluation
To evaluate our CSF model, we then considered each object
o and each monologue M, and retrained our model using all
data except that which was collected for object o or mono-
logue M (for example, while testing for object o1 in mono-
logue M1, we retrain our model with all the data except that
concerned with M1 and/or o1), and used this model (along
with a prior distribution over cognitive statuses for that object
as described below) to simulate what status would be pre-
dicted for that object at each point in that monologue. After
each of these utterances, we evaluated the model’s prediction
by comparing it to the majority opinion from participants who
had provided data for that object at that point in that mono-
logue. Combining these prediction results for all eight objects
in all four utterances in all four monologues produced a 128-
element prediction vector for the model.
Specifically, we computed these prediction vectors for each
of two CSF models, each of which used a different prior dis-
tribution p(St−1o ) over cognitive statuses:
U-Model: an uninformed prior in which each cognitive sta-
tus was assigned a prior probability of 0.33.
I-Model: a (weakly) informed prior, in which the three cog-
nitive statuses were assigned prior probabilities I= 0.05,
A= 0.1, F= 0.85. These probabilities reflect the fact that
objects are a priori far more likely to be familiar than ac-
tivated, and among the set of things that are currently ac-
tivated it is more likely for a given object to be activated
than in focus. While in theory this distribution could be
learned from data, in a realistic environment it may be the
case that hundreds or thousands of objects are familiar and
only one is in focus, yielding an extremely unbalanced dis-
tribution. This weakly informed prior thus represents an
optimistic belief state in which the prior probability of any
given object being in focus is artificially boosted.
In addition to these two prediction vectors produced by dif-
ferent parameterizations of our CSF model, we also computed
prediction vectors for two baseline models:
Finite State Machine: First, we computed the decisions
made by a rule-based FSM model, which formalized a
set of heuristics from the GH coding protocol (the same
heuristics previously used in the work of Williams and
Scheutz (2019)). In this FSM, the states correspond to
cognitive statuses, and transitions are triggered based on
linguistic statuses observed in incoming utterances. For
example, for an FSM dedicated to some object, if that ob-
ject is mentioned in a topic role, this will deterministically
trigger a state transition to in focus.
Random Baseline: Second, we computed the decisions
made by a random baseline (RB) model, which predicted
cognitive statuses at random.
Results
The overall accuracy of each model (i.e., the proportion of
correct entries in each model’s prediction vector) is shown in
Table 1. This demonstrates that our U-model had the highest
accuracy, and that our I-model and the theoretical FSM model
had the same accuracy, slightly less than the U-model. The
accuracy measure of the FSM model suggests that the heuris-
tics encoded in the GH coding protocol are a good represen-
tation of the patterns that can be learned from the data we
collected, given our choice of data annotations. The similar-
ity of the CSF model’s accuracy to that of the FSM similarly
demonstrates that the CSF did a good job of automatically
learning these patterns from our data. The slightly higher
accuracy of the U-model over the I-model suggests that the
uniformly distributed prior probabilities may have been more
helpful than the weakly informed prior distribution. Finally,
the performance advantage of all of these models over the RB
model provides a good baseline measurement of success.
Table 1: Accuracy measure of each model
model accuracy
U-model 82.03
I-model 81.25
FSM 81.25
RB 32.81
To validate these intuitive assessments, we formally com-
pared our four models using six pairwise McNemar’s Tests
(Bostanci & Bostanci, 2013; McNemar, 1947), whose results
are shown in Tables 2 and 4.
Table 2: Contingency Table entries for model pairs
model1 model2 Nss Ns f N f s N f f
U-model I-model 104 1 0 23
U-model FSM 89 16 15 8
U-model RB 34 71 8 15
I-model FSM 89 15 15 9
I-model RB 33 71 9 15
FSM RB 34 70 8 16
Table 2 (see also Figure 2) shows the contingency table
values used by McNemar’s test for each pairwise compari-
son, where the four N counts refer to the contingency table
cells shown in Table 3. That table layout simply depicts a
general 2x2 contingency table (Clark & Clark, 1999; Liddell,
1976) comparing the performance of two models A and B.
Here, N f f and Nss respectively denote the number of instances
where both models failed and succeeded. N f s and Ns f respec-
tively denote the instances where one model failed and the
other succeeded.
Table 3: A 2X2 Contingency Table
model A success model A fail
model B success Nss Ns f
model B fail N f s N f f
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Figure 2: Comparison between models
The McNemar’s Test statistics χ2 (with 1 degree of free-
dom) and p-values (Bostanci & Bostanci, 2013; Fay, 2011;
Liddell, 1976) are calculated for each pair of models as shown
in Table 4. By looking at the McNemar’s Test results the fol-
lowing deductions can be formally made:
1. The U-model and I-model show similar performance (χ2 ≈
0 and p-value = 1).
2. The U-model and FSM also show similar performance
(χ2 ≈ 0 and p-value = 1).
3. The FSM and RB models show significant difference in
their performance (χ2 = 47.705 and p-value = 0.0001).
4. The CSF model and RB model differ significantly in per-
formance regardless of model parametrization.
5. The performance difference between the CSF model and
the FSM model is not statistically significant.
Table 4: McNemar’s Test statistic (χ2) and p-values
χ2 p-value
U-model, I-model 0.000 1.000
U-model, FSM 0.000 1.000
U-model, RB 48.658 <0.0001
I-model, FSM 0.033 0.8551
I-model, RB 46.513 <0.0001
FSM, RB 47.705 <0.0001
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we present the notion of a Cognitive Status Fil-
ter: a statistical model for estimating the cognitive status
of some entity that may be referenced in conversation. We
then described a Mechanical Turk experiment used to gather
ground truth data to train this model, and demonstrate how the
accuracy of this model compares to a rule-based FSM model
and a random baseline.
The overall accuracy of our CSF model in predicting the
cognitive status of an object was slightly better than that
achieved by a FSM. This simultaneously speaks in favor of
the heuristics encoded in the GH coding protocol, while also
demonstrating that those heuristics are learnable from data.
However, there are a number of directions for future work
that may significantly improve the potential performance of
the statistical CSF model over the rule-based FSM model.
First, this experiment used a relatively small corpus col-
lected in a single task; given the fact that our model works
on this small dataset one follow up step would be to collect
a larger dataset from a broader set of HRI scenarios (prefer-
ably a gold-standard English corpus), as that could yield a
model with better generalizability. Second, our model cur-
rently only uses linguistic status information that is already
explicitly called for by the subset of the GH coding pro-
tocol used to design the FSM model. However, the CSF
model could straightforwardly be extended to include addi-
tional non-linguistic cues like gaze and gesture which are
critical in both human-human and human-robot communica-
tion (e.g., for establishing joint attention (Moore, Dunham,
& Dunham, 2014; Peeters, Azar, & O¨zyu¨rek, 2014)), which
although not well described in the GH coding protocol would
clearly play a role in informing notions of cognitive status.
Similarly, we considered only three simple linguistic features
(topic mentioned, mentioned, and not mentioned) given by
the GH coding protocol, whereas more complex and varied
linguistic features could improve performance. Finally, one
of the theoretical advantages of the CSF model is its ability to
handle uncertainty. This will be critical for integrating gaze
and gesture, which are inherently ambiguous and uncertain
cues.
In addition, one limitation of our experimental paradigm is
that users may have been coerced into selecting an object in
the scene as a candidate referent for “it” (question Q1, i.e., as
opposed to selecting nothing at all) even when they believed
that no felicitous referent existed. This could be addressed in
future work by modifying the question asked to participants
in order to allow them to not select any present object if they
did not believe them to be sufficiently likely candidates.
Finally, in future work, we intend to leverage our CSF
model to implement a GH-theoretic anaphora generation
model that uses an object’s cognitive status when selecting
a referring form during natural language generation. We fur-
ther plan to integrate this model into the DIARC cognitive
robotic architecture (Scheutz et al., 2019) and demonstrate its
use in realistic HRI scenarios.
Data Availability
Our experimental data can be found at https://osf.io/qse7y/,
along with our analysis scripts, experimental materials, and
model outputs.
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